The true story of companies E&G,
28th Infantry Regiment

All of the history books state that while the 8th Infantry Division was outside Brest, two of the rifle companies from the 28th Infantry regiment were captured. This is true. The books also state that they were captured because they were taken in by a German ruse. This is not true. For the first time we present the actual story of what happened that night. This extract is from the book "Battle for Brest" by Jonathan Gawne. All rights reserved. Anyone with further information on this action should drop us a line ( jon 'at' militaria.com. We're always interested in finding out more of the story.

Perhaps the most memorable incident to happen to the 8^th Division at Brest took place when the 28^th Infantry was trying to push forward to straighten the division lines. On the night of 29 Aug. companies E&G of 2/28^th infiltrated behind the German lines, but were cut off. After holding their ground as long as possible the two rifle companies were forced to surrender. Most histories about Brittany mention that two companies of the 28^th Infantry Regiment were captured just north of Brest, but not even the official U.S. Army has the story correct.

According to the regimental history, upon which most others have relied, a truce was held in front of the 28^th Infantry lines to allow both sides to pull out their wounded and dead. According to the story, the Germans took advantage of this truce to infiltrate some paratroopers behind the American lines. Examining the battalion records and questioning veterans from these companies shows this is not what happened.

2/28^th had run up against some strong defenses in the previous days, but the men had noticed that the Germans kept their emplacements to the sides of the fields next to the hedgerows, generally in the corners. A plan was developed to move two full infantry companies through the center of a field during a dark night. They planned to capture an area to the south of Kergroas, which would deny the Germans observation of the regimental area. About 0200 hrs. on 29 Aug. both Company E, commanded by Captain Charles Tisdale, and Company G, Commanded by Captain Burke, began to move in single file right down the center of a large field. Captain Burke had just joined the company the day before so he told Lieutenant Rossini, who had previously been commanding the company, to continue to run things while he got acclimated. The men were ordered to keep their rifle safeties on and to only use the bayonet until daylight. Both companies were to move to their objectives behind the German lines and dig in for an all around defense. Company F would follow them later at dawn to clear any Germans that had been by-passed.

At this time all of the 28^th Infantry rifle companies were on the line, except for F/28^th which served as the regimental reserve. The 3^rd Battalion was to the left and the 1^st Battalion was on the right flank. Both E&G Companies infiltrated to their positions with only one casualty. At 0215 hrs. a German machine gun fired out across the field wounding one man. He did not cry out, and the infiltration continued until all were in position. At 0545 G Company called in on their SCR-300 radio saying they were in position. At 0630 Company E also reported they were ready. Not until 0700 hrs. did the Germans discover the Americans behind their lines. At that time they started to probe the American positions to determine their strength.

The area that E&G were in was relatively small and the men were dug in in small groups. When Lt. Rossini’s radio went out he was close enough to yell directions for artillery support over to Captain Tisdale, who relayed them on his radio. The previous day the Germans had captured an American Sherman tank that had bogged down in the area. Now they turned this tank against the cut off Americans. Relaying instructions, Rossini and Tisdale were successful in bringing down artillery fire on the tank. Suddenly they were told that due to the ammunition shortage they could get no more assistance from the artillery. Captain Tisdale was later told by a German officer that they were listening in to the American radio communications and once they heard that there would be no more artillery support they pressed the attack. As he walked back a prisoner Tisdale personally wittnessed the Germans listening to American transmissions at their command post.

The key to breaking the American positions proved to be the captured Sherman. The Americans had not expected to run into any tanks so had left their bazookas behind. Attempts by F/28^th to get a few bazooka teams to the besieged men proved futile. The besieged men had only a handful of antitank rifle grenades (in the E/28^th sector there was an unconfirmed report that the men had knocked out one tank, probably a self-propelled gun). Tank destroyers were brought up to try and target the German armor, but they could not move up close enough to get a shot due to the intervening terrain.

A few men tried to knock out the captured Sherman. Pfc. Willard Jones and Sgt *Walker jumped out of their foxholes and climbed onto the tank. Jones pounded on the hatches with a grenade trying to find a way to toss one inside, until German machine gun fire sprayed the tank and wounded him. Sgt. Walker actually shimmied out on the tank barrel to stuff a grenade down the muzzle. Just as he got near the end of the tube the main gun fired and the concussion stunned and knocked him off. Captain Tisdale took an antitank rifle grenade and tried to work his way around the side of the tank for a shot against the thinner armor. Without warning a German paratrooper appeared out of the darkness and put a machine pistol to his ribs. Unable to fire back due to the grenade mounted on his weapon, and with a German gun stuck in his side, Tisdale had no choice but to give up. At 1218 hrs. Battalion headquarters reported that they had lost radio contact with both of the companies. As the Americans were herded together, Pfc. Jones turned to Tisdale with tears streaking down his face and said, “I tried Captain, I really tried, but I just could not knock out that tank.” Both Sgt. Walker and Pfc. Jones would later be awarded the Silver Star for their efforts.

At 1245 hrs. men from the Regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon reported that they could see a large group of Americans being marched down the road towards Brest. An artillery observer reported this on the corps radio net so that no artillery units in the area would mistake them for Germans and start shelling. The loss of the two companies left a weak spot in the American lines and the Germans attempted to break through it. Every man from the 2^nd Battalion, including the cooks, were called up to man the defenses. With assistance from A/28^th and the 2^nd Battalion A&P Platoon the lines were held and the German attack was driven off. The lost companies were soon reconstituted from 247 green replacements rushed up. The few experienced Officers and NCOs remaining in the 2^nd Battalion were shuffled around to try and get a mix of experienced men in all companies.

For cutting off the American penetration and capturing what was reportedly close to 500 Americans, Major Reino Hamer, commander of the First Battalion, 7^th FJ Regiment, would receive the Knight’s Cross. There are claims that the Germans purposely hid in their foxholes, allowing the Americans to pass them by, then cut them off. The evidence does not support this, and both veterans’ memories and official records support the fact that the Americans had successfully infiltrated the German lines at night and were cut off when Company F was not allowed to put its full strength into the follow-up.

The problem was that Company F, under command of Captain Frank Gray, was the only company the entire regiment had in reserve. Captain Gray was only allowed to move forward with his 3^rd platoon, commanded by Lt. Jonekait, which became stuck in the town of Kergroas. The Germans were defending in buildings with thick stone walls, with deep trenches around them. Afterwards, Gray stated that if he had been allowed to use his entire company he would have been able to break through.

The story of the truce actually comes from the 3^rd Battalion sector. On the same night as the 2^nd Battalion infiltration, the 3^rd Battalion had also been attempting a night attack, but ran into a minefield. After the first man tripped a mine the Germans were alerted and opened up. The 3/28^th was driven back, leaving a number of wounded and dead in front of the German lines. At roughly 1015 hrs. the commander of K/28^th, Capt. Clarence Hollingsworth, called back to battalion headquarters saying that two German medics had come forward, accompanied by a wounded American, to say that there were a number of casualties lying between the lines. They asked for a truce to allow both sides to remove the dead and wounded. The offer was accepted by the battalion commander and the three aid men attached to K/28^th went out to recover their wounded. They reported that the German medics were helpful in pointing out where the Americans lay.

The terms of the truce were that there was to be no firing in the battalion area. At 1105 hrs. some small German mortars from outside the area began to shell Company K. His aid men were still working between the lines, so Hollingsworth sent one of the German medics to stop the mortars. As soon as the German reached the mortar position the firing stopped. Before the truce ended the German medics returned to say they had been ordered to bring back the American casualty that had come with them, as he was technically their prisoner. Hollingsworth refused.

A few minor attempts by the Germans to take advantage of the truce were noted. Two Germans removed some ammunition from a nearby knocked out American tank. Another German soldier left his dugout and retrieved a machine gun that had been dropped in the open. A German naval officer walked out between the lines, probably to examine the terrain. There is no evidence in the battalion or regimental records that this truce was used by the Germans to capture E&G/28^th. The only effect the truce may have had on the fate of the two companies was that it prevented the 3rd Battalion from attacking in support of them. However, in the 3^rd Battalion records there is no mention of any request for such help, or that they felt under pressure to come to the aid of the two companies. It was the 1^st Battalion, on the right, that had attacked forward towards E&G, but had been stopped by strong German defenses. The regimental records state, “Conflicting reports regarding enemy patrols and infiltrations were received throughout the day, none of them were confirmed.” Most of these were probably Germans attempting to move into the vacated E&G company positions.

For some reason the truce would be used to explain how two companies could be captured. An order was issued from the division commander that no more truces would be allowed unless he approved them. It was probably easier to blame the capture on Germans using a truce, than on the failure of the rest of the regiment to break through to them, or the lack of artillery support. Col. Bailey, the 2^nd Battalion commander, was relieved that morning. The next day the regimental commander, Col. K.S. Anderson was replaced by Col. Merrit E. Olmstead. It should also be noted that Captain Hollingsworth was considered a superb officer and would rise to the rank of Lt. Col. before being killed near the end of the war. He would not have fallen for a German ruse.

It was not until November 1944 that the official Adjutant General’s report on the matter would conclude that the truce had no bearing on the capture of the two companies. Although the official document requests that the unit records be corrected to reflect this, it was never done and the incorrect story was entered in the history books.

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