HISTORY OF THE 28TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

(Part 5, a continuation of Part 4, Starting January 1945)

During the remainder of January and February the Regiment continued it's holding mission along the west bank of the Roer River. Units improved their defenses with additional mine fields, barbed wire and Anti-Tank obstacles. There was little enemy activity. German patrols, usually 5 or 6 mens operated intermittently along in the Regimental zone. Patrol activity, however was mostly of a defensive nature. The enemy attempted to obtain American prisoners in an effort to learn Allied intentions in this area. Occasionally small enemy groups harassed the Regiment by cutting communication wires. One large patrol was driven off in the Bergstein area. Enemy mortar and artillery fire throughout the period was light. There was little air activity. Smoke was used by the Germans on several occasions, probably to cover relief of troops. Very few prisoners were taken during the month of January. Snow capes were made for the men, many were improvised from sheets requisitioned from German civilians and sewed by German women from the nearby towns. Some vehicles were painted white.

On the 5th of February 1945, the Division was transferred to the VII Corps, First Army. By 8 February 1945 all units of the Regiment had been relieved and had taken up new positions in the area formerly held by the 104th Division at Lendersdorf opposite Niederau. Along the entire west bank of the Roer River, from Linnich to Bergstein, Infantry and Armored Divisions of the First and Ninth Armies were poised to assault the major water barrier West of the Rhine. The Germans had blown the sluice gates of the Schwammenauel Dam containing the bulk of the headwaters of the Roer and which had been the primary objective of most allied offensive action in this sector. The normally placid, knee deep Roer River rose to a depth of more than 10 feet in the Duren area.

On the 8th of February, Engineers were moving bridging material to forward areas. Repairs on roads were being conducted for the heavy traffic of trucks and tanks that would soon roll over them.

The 8th and 104th Divisions were to attack on the morning of 10 Feb 45 seize Duren and the VII Corps bridgehead and draw the Germans off balance for the stringer assault by the Ninth Army to the north on the following day. On 10 Feb 45 the Roer was still rising. The attack was postponed.

The Regimental front was held by the 3rd Battalion while the other two battalions continued training troops in river crossings and street fighting. By 15 Feb 45, the Roer had reached it's highest point and was beginning to recede. Meanwhile, the attack was again postponed and the regiment continued training in river crossings by assault boats. Patrol activity across the flooded Roer was particularly hazardous since many of the enemy land mines had been inundated making it difficult to land with safety on the Eastern bank of the river. Several Engineer and Infantry parties had crossed the river in assault boats, although most of these operations proved more costly than practical. On the night of

16-17 Feb 45 three men of the Regiment were rowed across the river by an Engineer crew. They were equipped with a radio and enough food for the following day. It was planned to contact them again the next night and to return them to the West bank of the river. On the following night and two succeeding nights attempts were made to reach the stranded patrol. They were unsuccessful, however, and it was presumed that the patrol had been captured.

Small enemy groups were intermittently improving their positions on the east bank of the river. Enemy air activity increased. Several formations of jet propelled planes appeared over the regimental sector, bombing and strafing front lines and rear installations. The river although receding steadily was still above it's normal level. The current was exceedingly rapid.

D-Day for the Roer crossing was again set. This time for 23 Feb 45. Division plans were again completed. Division assault elements were to cross the river on a front of approximately 7,000 yards. The 28th Infantry was given a sector approximately 4,000 yards wide, including the town of Niederau. The 1st Division on the right was not to cross the river until the 28th Infantry had secured it's bridgehead, consequently the Divisions south flank would be open. Plans called for troops of the assaulting units to cross in boats powered by 22 and 50 HP motors. One foot bridge, one infantry support bridge and one Treadway Pontoon bridge were to be constructed in the regimental sector. In addition a Class 40 Bailey Bridge was to be erected in the 13th Infantry sector.

The Roer River had receded only slightly and was still approximately seven feet deep and flowed at a speed of approximately 10 MPH. At 0245 on the morning of 23 Feb 45, the heaviest artillery barrage ever fired by the 8th Division artillery, began to pound enemy river defenses and communications along the entire Roer River front. Heavy artillery batteries of the First and Ninth Armies joined in the barrage which preceded H-Hour. At 0245, 45 minutes before the scheduled jump off of all other units, Maj. Edward J. Regan and his 3rd Battalion, 28th Infantry climbed into their assault boats on the extreme south flank of the Division front and pushed for the enemy held east bank of the Roer. Men of the 12th Engineer Combat Battalion and the 3rd Battalion A & P Platoon manned the boats. The raging 12 MPH current was as hazardous as No-Man's Land as the men of the 3rd Battalion ever crossed. In spite of the current and the difficult east bank of the river, approximately 60 per cent of Regan's men reached the opposite shore. Companies K and L crossed in the first wave, drove quickly into a system of trenches on the opposite river bank and came out with 23 Germans prisoners, apparently still dazed by the tremendous artillery concentration. They did not realize as yet that any troops had crossed the river. Half of the men who survived the river crossing lost their rifles and helmets. All mortars and three of the four machine gun sections were also lost.

Grenades were redistributed and rifles were taken from the German prisoners. Major Regan lead his men south of Niederau to a road fork at the edge of a patch of woods. The men of Companies K and L went all the way preceded by a rolling barrage of white phosphorus artillery shells, reaching the edge of the woods at 0430. Here they waited for Company I to join them.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 28th Infantry, attempted to cross 1,000 to 2,000 yards to the north at 0330 encountered even more serious difficulties. Six 1st Battalion assault boats overturned in midstream and men and equipment were carried far down the river. Heavy enemy mortar and artillery fires caused many casualties. All motor powered and 75 per cent of the assault boats were destroyed in the first crossing. Only elements of Companies, A, B, C and F, reached the east bank of the river north of Niederau, where they reorganized and prepared for offensive action.

Meanwhile Company I crossed the river and joined Companies L and K at the road fork near the edge of the woods southeast of Niederau. Troops of Companies L and K had taken 19 more prisoners, when the surprised a group of Germans, capturing them while they were still in bed, seizing a 77mm gun intact. An enemy wire party and a supply party were also captured as they moved along the road from Stockheim to Niederau, completely oblivious of American troops in the area.

Troops of the 2nd Battalion, who were to clear the southern part of Niederau and were then to relieve the 3rd Battalion at the road fork, had not been able to cross the river. Major Regan received instructions by radio to move his battalion forward to the eastern edge of the woods. Although virtually isolated, the battalion began moving east through the woods along the Niederau-Stockheim road. Company L on the right ran into an enemy strong point. Company I moved around to the south of Company I and dug the Germans out of log bunkers. The advance was resumed, although to the south were several more bunkers which had been bypassed. The 3rd Battalion reached the eastern edge of the woods by nightfall, meeting only light resistance. Here the troops dug in. Enough German weapons had been obtained so that all the men were armed. In one instance when the enemy counterattacked, a machine gunner allowed the Germans to come within 25 yards of his position before mowing then down. Because as he explained, "Then the men can get the Krauts' weapons for themselves." 25 Panzerfausts (German Bazooka) were taken and classes in their operation were conducted on the spot. During the night of 23-24 Feb. 45, the enemy made a serious effort to knock out from the air whatever river installations the Division had been able to construct across the Roer. Jet propelled ME-262's swooped down repeatedly bombing and strafing the river line. Except for one ferry, which was destroyed in the 28th Infantry sector, enemy aircraft had little success.

At darkness, Engineers had begun work on the Class 40 Bailey Bridge in the 13th Infantry sector. By 0530 the bridge was opened for use of foot troops and shortly thereafter vehicular traffic of all regiments started moving across to the eastern side of the Roer.

Sounds of armored movement in the Stockheim area were heard during the night from positions of the 3rd Battalion, 28th Infantry. Shortly after dawn the enemy hurled the first of six counterattacks during the day, against Major Regan's isolated battalion. Three enemy tanks supported the attack of a Company of Infantry. They came again and again from all sides. It was that the battalion was surrounded. Then at 1355 the enemy began all out assault on the trapped battalion, charging in from all sides in an attempt to annihilate the American forces. Major Regan called for the massed concentrations of all Division and Corps artillery which had been planned for such a situation as this. With perfect precision the tremendous volume of fire from every gun of every battery of six Field Artillery battalions crashed down on all sides of the surrounded battalion. Some of the men described it as the most fearsome defensive ever. Many of the enemy were killed beneath the avalanche of shrapnel which boxed in the 3rd Battalion. The counterattack was decisively broken. Only six of Major Regan's men were hit by shell fragments, although shells dropped as close as 75 yards from the battalion position. This, one of Major Regan's staff officers pointed out was an unquestionable indication of the accuracy with which the Battalion Commander "pinpointed" his units position on the map. It was a tribute to the perfection with which Division Artillery men planned their massed fires.

Troops of the 1st and 2nd Battalions had meanwhile, been transported. The 1st Battalion fought its way through Niederau from the north, clearing the town early in the day against only moderate resistance. The 2nd Battalion through the southern part of Niederau and began moving through the woods to establish contact with the 3rd Battalion. At 1905 that night Company E after a brisk fight reached the weary troops of the 3rd Battalion, opening up the way for supplies and ammunition to be brought up.

Stockheim was the primary objective of the 28th Infantry troops, now massed in the woods west of that town. At least six enemy SP guns fired on the troops as they emerged from the woods and advanced on the town across open ground. The 1st and 2nd Battalions converged on the strongly defended town and street fighting continued throughout the day. The enemy had to be dug out of cellars and trenches. By midnight the town of Stockheim was cleared except for a small group of buildings in the southern outskirts.

The 3rd Battalion, meanwhile, had maneuvered to the north, relieving the 121st Infantry at Binsfield at dusk, taking 12 additional prisoners out of town and then moving east to continue to attack the towns of Binsfelderburg, Rommelsheim and Berg-Ribenheim during the night. Attacking in a column of companies, the Battalion took the three towns in quick succession. As foot troops advanced on each town, a terrific artillery concentration was called down. When the artillery lifted, doughboys rushed the town before the defending troops could come out of the cellars to man their guns. By 0500 all three towns had been taken. Prisoner count was high, 104 being captured in Berg-Rubenheim alone. Two SP guns which had eluded the 3rd Battalion were finally captured and destroyed in Berg-Rubenheim.

Maj. Gen. W.G. Weaver was evacuated on 25 February 1945. Brig. Gen Bryant E. Moore, former Assistant Division Commander of the 104th Division took command of the 8th Infantry Division.

The 8th Reconnaissance Troop took over the town of Stockheim from the 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry on the still exposed division right flank. The 28th Infantry meanwhile had moved to Bergerhausen. The 3rd Battalion was given the mission of moving through woods of Kirpen during the night and seizing a large Rheinish Castle "Schloss-Lorsfield." The Battalion moving in column of Companies moved through the woods unobserved, until at 0100 the castle was reached. The men of Company L surrounded the moated fortress of several centuries ago, shot a guard and stormed through the gates. After a brief skirmish, the enemy garrison surrendered and 30 prisoners were taken.

Six men of Company L were left to guard the castle while the remainder of the Battalion returned to Bergerhausen.

On the night of 1 March 45, the 2nd and 3rd battalions were assigned a more hazardous mission. The battalions were to cross the Erft Canal at Gotzenkirchen, a village in the 104th Division sector, which was found unoccupied by a patrol on the previous afternoon. They were then to advance south against Modrath on a two battalion front, attacking the town in conjunction with the 121st Infantry. The crossing was made without any mishaps shortly before darkness. The troops swung across the water barrier on the girder of a blown bridge and moved into the thick woods east of Erft. The 2nd Battalion then moved directly south along the east bank of the canal. The 3rd Battalion moved further east maneuvering to take the castle and small buildings at Boisdorf, from there advance southward against Modrath.

The column of Companies of the 3rd Battalion had approached within 125 yards of the castle without being detected. Suddenly several explosions broken the silence. The entire column had walked into a dense minefield. The enemy was alerted and heavy small arms fire from the castle and the woods hit the trapped infantrymen. The commanders of both Companies K and L were killed. Several other officers and men were wounded and the rest scattered. Major Regan reorganized his force as rapidly as possible. The troops of the Battalion rushed the castle, battled with the enemy defenders in fierce hand to hand combat, and took the castle. They then settled down to occupy the castle and surrounding buildings for the remainder of the night. All communications with Company I were lost until the following day. Others of the scattered troops found their way into the buildings now occupied by the Battalion.

Shortly before dawn, a group of soldiers were observed approaching Boisdorf, not knowing whether they were American or German troops Major Regan called to them to halt. They continued to advance and the Battalion Commander gave the signal to open fire. Some of the enemy troops had come son close to the buildings occupied by 3rd Battalion troops that a hand grenade which dropped out of a window killed three Germans. The counterattacking forces, were finally driven back until they were trapped in several buildings, which they had reoccupied. At dawn, artillery fire was called down upon the enemy held buildings causing many causalities until at least 52 Germans had surrendered.

The 2nd Battalion, supported by elements of the 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion moved south against light opposition and entered the northern outskirts of Modrath early on the morning of March 2. The 1st Battalion, 121st Infantry fired into Modrath in support of the troops of the 28th Infantry, while continuing to hold it's railroad embankment positions.

A tank dozer brought up during the morning to clear rubble blocking an underpass the rough the embankment was knocked out by an enemy SP gun. Another underpass was discovered further to the south. By noon the canal had been bridged by the Engineers and tanks and Tank Destroyers moved across. Enemy resistance was fierce when German troops bolstered by SP guns, but crumbled as soon as the guns were knocked out. Artillery fire was fierce. The fight continued during most of the day. With the 2nd Battalion moving in from the north and the 121st Infantry coming in from the west, the town was cleared before nightfall. Simultaneously with the battle of Modrath, the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry was fighting for the town of Habblerath to the northeast. After a wide flanking maneuver, during which enemy planes strafed the troops repeatedly, the Battalion entered Habblerath after daylight. Resistance in the town, particularly from SP guns was strong. Enemy strong points were marked by artillery smoke shells and at 0900 an air bombardment mission was flown against the town. The troops then moved in quickly and cleared Habbelrath by 1000.

The enemy counterattacked from the southwest shortly thereafter but was thrown back.

That night, while the 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry relieved elements of the 121st Infantry in Modrath, the 1st and 3rd Battalions were to continue the attack to the south. The 3rd Battalion left Boisdorf shortly after midnight, passed through the 2nd Battalion in Modrath and attacked towards Bottembroich. Company I, which had rejoined the Battalion during the day, led the column of Companies. At the approaches to Bottenbroich, dense machine gun fire pinned down the company. Company K maneuvered around Company I, hit the enemy pocket from the west and wiped it out. Company I then moved on to seize Bottembroich. Company L drove beyond the town and mines, to the factory southeast of it. As the company neared this area, a terrific artillery barrage was laid down. At 0455 the artillery lifted. Companies K and L stormed the factory area, quickly cleared the enemy from the above ground installations and discovered the mine shaft leading into the earth. One guard was killed, the other two quickly surrendered. With Major Regan leading, the men of Company L climbed down seven 15 foot ladders. At the bottom they came upon an elaborate network of more then two miles of underground passages. 200 civilians were found living in the subterranean corridors. Among them were 91 members of the German Army, who were quickly rounded up.

The 1st Battalion reached the northern edge of Grefrath at approximately 0300. The fire from enemy SP guns became intense. As the 1st Battalion came in, enemy guns withdrew. The town was taken after a brisk street fight. Gains were consolidated and mopping up the area continued during the day. At 1930 that evening, the 1st and 2nd Battalions began an advance along a motor route between the network of lignite mines towards the city of Frechen, two miles south of Cologne. One hour later, the 3rd Battalion began a wide enveloping movement from the southwest.

Frechen was to attacked from three sides. The lignite mimes were a chain of huge pits approximately 50 to 100 feet deep which honeycombed the entire area over which an advance against Frechen must move. Only routes of approach to the city were narrow causeway between the pits, which could be easily be defended by the Germans. Along these causeways the three attacking forces moved. Moving into the attack, the 1st Battalion, advancing directly toward the city from the west immediately encountered intense mortar fire. The Battalion continued to advance in spite of enemy fire and by 2200, Company A had reached the western edge of Benzelrath. Company C advancing astride the main road also entered the town, only to find the bridge over one of the pits along the route to Frechen had been blown.

The 2nd Battalion advancing along a much longer route met only light resistance from enemy small arms fire and entered Frechen shortly after midnight. The 3rd Battalion infiltrated through 2,000 yards of enemy held territory before it ran into a strong point covering a 100 foot gap in the causeway. Unable to move to the other side of the gap without meeting intense enemy fire, the battalion spent the remainder of the night on the narrow ledge, 100 feet from the enemy. Company L succeeded in crossing to the other side, farther to the north, shortly after daylight and took the enemy strong point from the flank. Enemy machine guns were emplaced in cement bunkers and covered by a series of logged emplacements, manned by 12-15 riflemen. 50 prisoners were taken by the men of Company L. Many of the enemy were killed and the remainder fled. The battalion drove swiftly toward Frechen.

Meanwhile the 2nd Battalion encountered little resistance within Frechen, had cleared the entire northeast section by daybreak. Engineers had quickly constructed a bridge across the gap which was holding up the 1st Battalion in Benzelrath. The Battalion then advanced through the town followed closely by the bulk of the 644th TF and 740th Tank Battalions. Resistance was strong particularly in the Benzelrath area.

Early in the afternoon the 1st and 3rd Battalions linked up and by darkness the city was completely cleared. Company B which had ben attached to the 3rd Battalion during this maneuver around the southern part of the city, seized the town of Bacheim, southeast of Frechen. During the night Company K cleared the factory area 1000 yards east of Frechen.

On the night of 4-5 March 45, the 121st Infantry passed through the 28th Infantry and the regiment took up the duties of guarding the open right flank.

Shortly after midnight 5 March 45, the 2nd Battalion attacked and cleared Kalschaun. The 3rd Battalion then passed through the 2nd Battalion and drove forward to Konraderhof, taking that town by 0130. The 3rd Battalion then advanced towards Rondorf along the main road. Four Mark IV tanks which had been bypassed, passed through the 3rd Battalion, the men not immediately recognizing then, thinking they were own tanks, let them pass. Once within the column, the tanks began to fire on the troops, disorganizing the battalion. The tanks withdrew, continuing to harass the Battalion as they attempted to reorganize. A bazooka team firing on the tanks soon sent them fleeing. The battalion reorganized and continued the movement into Rondorf.

By the time the foot troops entered the town, the civilians had already gathered all rifles from the German soldiers. The town fell without a fight.

The 1st Battalion attacking also at midnight, quickly seized the towns of Berenrath and Knapsack, in neither of which did the enemy show much will to fight.

On the night of 6-7 March 45, the regiment continued the attack. The 1st Battalion advancing towards Meschenich, reached the town shortly after midnight. Resistance in the town was severe. At dawn, when the town had fallen, a strong counterattack supported by three tanks hit the battalion. Friendly artillery fire fell on the troops of the Battalion causing 30 casualties. The enemy counterattack was finally gotten under control and repulsed. Driving on toward Medendorf, the 1st Battalion was hit again. This time by four tanks. The 3rd Battalion was ordered to take the town. Smoke was placed on the town and at 1500 that afternoon the men of Company I, riding tanks of the 740th Tank Battalion, stormed Immendorf and took it within an hour at a cost of only six men injured.

That night the 3rd Battalion was ordered to take Rodenkirchen on the Rhine. Moving through the 104th Division in Cologne, the battalion hit the suburb Rodenkirchen from the north. At the edge of the town a machine gun nest was silenced by a grenade throwing patrol. No further resistance was encountered. Forty prisoners surrendered without a fight. The 3rd Battalion continued driving down the west bank of the Rhine to Weiss. That town fell at 1000 to the men of Company K on tanks, while Company L closed in on the town from the west across open terrain. Codorf, also on the Rhine, fell to the 1st Battalion during the night of 6-7 March 45.

The next morning the 1st and 2nd Battalions joined to clear Surth, with the mopping up of enemy stragglers (including four roving SP guns) that afternoon. All organized resistance in the Division sector west of the Rhine had been destroyed. Several rounds of artillery fire were aimed at several barges which were carrying tanks and infantry attempting to reach the east bank of the Rhine.

On March 8, The Division was placed in Corps reserve. This was the first time, except for brief periods of travel from sector to another that the Division was not in contact with the enemy during the eight months since first going to action on July 8,1944. The Regiment was relived by elements of the 104th Division and went into an assembly area.

Training and rehabilitation programs were set up and troops were given a respite from constant contact with the enemy. After six days in reserve, the Division received orders to relieve the 1st Infantry Division, holding the Rhine River line directly south of the former 8th Division sector, and the 28th Infantry again faced the enemy across the Rhine.

At this time First Army efforts were directed towards the enlargement of the bridgehead east of the Rhine opposite the Remagen bridge, which had been captured intact on 9 March 45. Constant watchfulness along the Rhine was required to frustrate and possible enemy attempts to destroy the bridge. Except for intermittent light artillery shelling and movements of individuals and small groups east of the Rhine, this was a comparatively inactive period. Small numbers of prisoners continued to be picked up, most of them stragglers and deserters.

On March 22, orders were received to relieve the 104th Division in the adjacent sector to the north. The 28th Infantry now held the sector that originally been held by the Division. Comparative inactivity continued.

Meanwhile First Army troops had broken out of the Remagen bridgehead in multiple thrusts, deep into the heart of Germany.

On the night of 29-30 March 45, the 28th Infantry was relieved by elements of the 86th Infantry Division, recently arrived on the continent and along with the rest of the Division went into the trans-Rhine sector, taking up a position along the south bank of the Sieg River.

Small enemy groups scattered throughout the difficult terrain, harassed attacking elements and impeded their advance. The 28th Infantry encountered only light resistance from small arms weapons. Five towns were taken during the day as units of the Regiment moved north to reach the Sieg River in several places. The captured towns were: Wissen, Alsdorf, Scheuerfeld, Burche, and Betzdorf. The enemy resisted fiercely in Betzdorf and Scheurerfeld with heavy small arms, mortar and artillery fires. For the most part, however, resistance was disorganized and numerous prisoners were taken. The following day the town of Insdorf was seized and patrols sent across the Seig River.

Reconnoitering a railroad tunnel, they discovered four cars loaded with bombs and two cars of small arms ammunition. During the night of March 31, orders were received to cross the Sieg River and establish a bridgehead sufficiently wide so that the east-west road along the river could be used. The 2nd Battalion crossed the Sieg River and advanced almost to the bridgehead objective. During the night 100 enemy infantryman crossed the Sieg River south of the 2nd Battalion, temporarily cutting off two companies. These enemy troops were rounded up and Wissen cleared for the second time. The 1st and 3rd Battalions secured the high ground north of the river in their sector against moderate resistance and cleared towns of Kirchen and Betzdorf during the night.

On the night of April 4, Company A was almost completely cut off by a strong force of enemy troops which had infiltrated behind them during the night. The enemy counterattack was finally beaten off later in the morning with the assistance of Company B.

On April 5, The Regiment was relieved by the 310th Infantry, 78th Division and in turn relieved the 8th Reconnaissance Troops and elements of the 121st Infantry on the right flank of the Division sector. The was is preparation for a full offensive to be opened on April 6,1945.

The coordinated campaign to destroy or capture enemy forces trapped in the Ruhr-Sieg pocket began on the morning of April 6. From the north, units of the Ninth U.S. Army were to apply pressure against the enemy in the heavy industrial area of the Ruhr River. All along the southern rim of the pocket, units of the First U.S. Army were to drive north from the Sieg River. Other First Army units, driving deep into central Germany, had effectively sealed off the enemy pocket from the east.

Major General Ridgeway's XVIII Corps (Airborne), consisting of the 8th, 78th, and 86th Infantry Divisions and the 13th Armored Division, was to make the main effort, driving swiftly northwest to cut the pocket in two. The 78th Division on the left and the 8th Division were to begin the Corps assault.

With all three Regiments abreast, the 8th Division began it's attack at 0600 April 6. The 28th Infantry had not fully completed it's shift in position at the time of the attack. The 3rd Battalion, which had gone into the line during the preceding night, jumped off at 0300 and cleared the town of Erndtebruck by early afternoon. One tiger tank and two other armored vehicles were destroyed. The Battalion continued it's advance taking Birkelbach after a brisk fight. The 2nd Battalion joined the 3rd in the attack, advancing approximately three miles. Substantial gains were made on April 8, the Regiment gained over 10,000 yards during the day. The 1st Battalion reaching Wirdlinghausen, and the 2nd entering Rinske.

On April 9, the 86th Division passed through the 28th Infantry and went into the attack on the Division right flank. The Regiment was given the mission of protecting the Division left flank, since advances during the day had placed the Division in advance of adjacent units.

On April 11, the 28th Infantry passed through the 13th Infantry, and the rapid advance continued. Principal resistance encountered was from enemy 20mm anti-aircraft huns which were being used as flat trajectory weapons. Gains of over ten miles were made and 2,200 prisoners were captured. Among the larger towns taken during the day were Meinerzhagen, Kierspe, and Beckinghausen.

Advances up to 10 miles were made on each of the following two days. Enemy forces were thoroughly disorganized and offered very little resistance. In a tunnel, troops discovered three carloads of ammunition, six railroad guns, and two locomotives with steam up. So effectively had Allied fighter planes taken command of the air than trains did not dare move during the daylight hours.

Upon reaching the industrial section north and west of Schwelm, enemy resistance suddenly became very heavy. The enemy defense consisted of four tanks, five selfpropelled guns, and a number of panzerfausts. Crossroads were defended with heavy small arms fire and automatic fire. In the town much sniper fire was received. Despite the strong opposition, Schwelm, Mislpe, Vorde, and smaller towns were cleared and over 2,000 prisoners were taken.

During this time the 13th Infantry made contact with elements of the 79th Division at the Ruhr River, and the Ruhr pocket had been completed, orders were received on April 15 to continue the offensive operations, attacking along the south bank of the Ruhr River. For this operation of the, CC"R" of the 13th Armored Division was attached to the 8th Infantry Division. The westward advance began at 1000 April 15, when the 121st Infantry passed through elements of the 28th. The 28th Infantry meanwhile had continued it's drive north to the Ruhr River.

All resistance in the Ruhr pocket ended on the morning of April 17. Only mopping up operations and the rounding up of remaining German soldiers, many of them in civilian clothes, remained to be accomplished.

Problems of supply and signal communication in the fast moving campaign were numerous. Wire crews, particularly, worked long hours to keep communication with forward elements. On days of most rapid advance Radio and Liaison officers and men were often the only means of communication, and the only way the Regiments had of keeping abreast of the situation.

From April 18 to April 26, the Regiment was employed in the military occupation of a section of the Ruhr-Rhine area, with headquarters at Waldbrol. A number of officers and men of the Regiment were temporarily attached to the Military Government section to facilitate administration of so large an area.

Among the chief problems of military government officers during this period was the control of displaced persons. The larger towns and cities were heavily over populated with Russian, Polish, Italian, and French slave laborers. When these areas had been cleared of German forces, displaced persons began looting and pillaging to gain revenge against the Germans and to obtain food and clothing. Several instances of near violence occurred in the Regimental area until the situation was brought under control. Transient displaced persons were placed in camps and provided with food for the most part from German civilian stores.

Less than ten days after the beginning of it's mission of occupation and military government in the Ruhr-Rhine area, the Division received orders for another combat mission. Still under XVIII Corps control, the Division was to travel north by motor to the Luneberg area. The XVIII Corps which included at this time also the 82nd Airborne Division, and the 7th Armored Division, was to attack across the Elbe, east of Hamberg, with the primary mission of protecting the right flank of the British Second Army. British units, after crossing the Elbe northwest of the XVIII Corps, were to drive northeast to Wismar, cutting off the Danish peninsula.

On April 29th the 82nd Airborne forced a crossing of the Elbe at Bleckede. During the afternoon of May 1 the 28th Infantry crossed the Elbe to join the attack with the 8th Reconnaissance Troop attached for this operation.

British troops, which had crossed had crossed the Elbe at 0200 on the 20th of April, were advancing rapidly against light resistance. The enemy was believed incapable of anything more than token resistance to the Allied drive. Reconnaissance flights detected a large scale westward movement of German troops and civilians north of the British and American advance, presumably fleeing from the Russian armies.

Task Force Canham, consisting principally of the 121st Infantry, 644th Tank Destroyer and 740th Tank Battalions, supported by the 56th Field Artillery and 83rd Armored Field Artillery Battalions, a battery of the 445th Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion, Company C of the 8th Medical Battalion, Company C of the 12th Engineer Combat Battalion, Company C of the 89th Chemical Battalion and led by the Assistant Division Commander, swung into the attack at 0600, May 2.

With doughboys riding tanks and tank destroyers and in trucks, they started off. Light initial resistance was brushed aside, and the powerful 8th Division force swept northward virtually unopposed. Followed as closely as possible by the 28th Infantry who gathered up bypassed enemy and cleared the woods and fields on both sides of the route used by Task Force Canham. More than a hundred cities, towns, and villages, including the large air base of Hagenow fell to the 8th Division that day. All along the routes of advance large groups of enemy troops awaited surrender. Roads were jammed with steady streams of prisoners. On foot, on bicycles and horseback, in all types of horse drawn and motor vehicles, troops of the defeated German armies were moving to the southwest. Men with their women and children, their animals and whatever worldly goods they could transport, surrendered at the already overcrowded prisoner of war enclosures. The Seventh Panzer Division or what was left of it, totaling 2,500 drove into the 28th area in tanks to surrender.

On the following day all available troops of the Regiment were engaged in directing officers and men of the disintegrating Wehrmacht into regimental prisoner of war enclosures. The convoys of motor vehicles, tractors and trailers, horse drawn carts and foot troops brought in more than 80,000 captives. Among them were ten German generals including the 27th Corps commander and his subordinates. Captured war material reached such huge proportions that much of it wasn't even counted. Near the town of Sulsdorf a complete V-Bomb assembly plant was found with over 60 V-1 bombs ready to launch and enough nitro-glycerine and ammunition to level or badly damage everything within a twenty mile area.

Near the town of Wobbelin in the Regimental area, Capt. Frederick A. Dry, Regimental Surgeon, uncovered a concentration camp where approximately 2,500 near starved political prisoners still remained alive. These men were evacuated and cared for under supervision of the 8th Medical Battalion. Several hundred emaciated bodies of men who were starved and beaten to death in the Wobbelin concentration camp were unearthed and buried after funeral services in the town squares of nearby communities. The civilian population was ordered to attend the burials, and many German men and women were taken through the camp itself.

The 28th Infantry had fought it's final battle in the European Theater of Operations . In ten months of combat, the units of the Regiment had captured over 115,000 prisoners of war and vast stores of enemy was material. The Regiment had taken part in the Normandy, Northern France, Rhineland, and Central European campaigns.