HISTORY OF THE 28TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

(Part 4, a continuation of Part 3, Starting November 1944)

On November 16th, the troops of the Division began the motor march to the V Corps sector, and by nightfall of the 19th, all elements of the division had closed into their positions in the area southeast of Aachen. The 2nd Ranger Battalion, 893rd Tank Destroyer Battalion, and the 86th Chemical Battalion were attached to the Division for its new mission.

Orders had already been received from the V Corps commander, to undertake an important offensive. One regiment, strongly reinforced, was to break out of the Hurtgen forest and seize the Hurtgen-Kleinhau ridge, considered by the enemy the key to his defenses west of Duren and the Cologne plain. That this was the German belief was evident from the massive defenses and the strength in men and guns massed in this area. The terrain west of Hurtgen was heavily wooded, boggy and irregular, with numerous gullies and steep cliffs. German engineers had expertly laid an anti-personnel mine field across the entire front of the zone of advance. Heavy wire entanglements blocked possible routes of approach. Enemy automatic weapons were well situated to cover all obstacles. Mortars and artillery batteries were zeroed in upon habitable assembly areas and all possible points of preparation. Enemy combat teams, all seasoned units reinforced with stragglers, were committed to the enemy defense of Hurtgen.

During the night of November 18, and the early morning of the 19th, the three battalions moved into position relieving elements of the 109th Infantry of the 28th Division. During the relief, light casualties were suffered due to motor and artillery fire coming from three sides. Anti-tank Company swapped guns with the 109th because they were in exposed positions and any undue movements immediately brought down mortar and artillery fires. The is was the beginning of a two and half month period of the hardest fighting that the regiment was to experience. The Battle of the Hurtgen Forest. The 1st Battalion went into position on the left of Vossenack. The route over which the Battalion went to position, left the town of Vossenack through an open field and down a sharp slope for a distance of several hundred yards. At the bottom of the slope, in a location referred to in the Army as a "draw" ran a small stream. On the other side of the stream, a heavily wooded area extended down to the water's edge, the stream running between two steep slopes. This wooded area was the fringe of the Hurtgen Forest. On the side of the stream nearest Vossenack the Germans had planted an extensive mine field of the "S" type anti-personnel mines. It was impossible to remove this mine field as the Germans had observation on this spot during the day and any movement immediately brought down a heavy artillery barrage.

It was found necessary to form carrying parties to take food, ammunition, water, and other supplies to the 1st and 2nd Battalions. On their return trip the casualties were brought out. The carrying parties suffered heavy casualties from the enemy artillery while going through the draw, and from enemy who had infiltrated in and threw hand grenades as our men passed.

The enemy was active day and night, over 5,000 rounds fell into the area during the day and the 20th of November. The Regimental Command Post was shelled several times during the day and movement was kept at a minimum. It was very evident that the enemy had a great deal of artillery massed in front of the Regiment, due to the fact that the weather was so bad visual observation of this artillery was out of the question. It was absolutely impossible for our artillery observation liaison planes to fly.

It was discovered that the enemy had moved in, in strength behind the 1st Battalion and the supply situation became critical. Supplies could only be taken in at night by carrying parties, who on their return evacuated the casualties, it was necessary at times for the carrying parties to fight their way in to the Battalion and out again.

On November 23, Company I under Capt. James W. Amyx was attached to the 1st Battalion and given the mission of cleaning out the area behind the 1st Battalion. The enemy consisting of well over a hundred infantrymen, were strongly organized, well dug in and expertly camouflaged. Ten enemy machine guns gave all around interlocking bands of fire. An enemy artillery forward observer radio team were dug in within the position. Six captured American mortars gave supporting fire. German Teller mines placed shoulder high in trees were connected to ground trip wires.

The Company Commanders attack order called for three platoon echeloned to the left rear to advance on a given azimuth. Shortly after the attack jumped off the trip wires activated the Teller mines, alerting the enemy, bringing down heavy machine gun cross fire and stopping the advancing platoons. The company commander with the leading platoon decided to maneuver this platoon by infiltrating to the left flank. The third platoon was to act as a base of fire by firing at an increased rate. This second attack was stopped by observed mortar and artillery fire. The company commander then endeavored to maneuver all three platoons to the left supported by fire of the light machine gun section, but once again the enemy's all around defense pinned down the advancing riflemen.

Undaunted by these setbacks, the company commander decided to deploy his entire company in a skirmish line with one platoon attacking from the left flank and two assaulting frontally. Once in position, the company commander and platoon leaders to their feet and yelled the enemy is retreating, bayonets fixed, everybody up, machine gun fire, over the top. The men sprung to their feet yelling and shooting as they ran. The shock action took the enemy by surprise and the Americans were in their midst before they could bring down their defensive fires. The ferocious bayonet assault so unnerved the enemy that they poured out of their emplacements and surrendered in groups. Over one hundred prisoners were taken in addition to a large number of enemy dead and wounded. The enemy artillery observer team was captured and documents taken from them revealed the exact location of: 7 Command Posts , 6 Artillery gun batteries , 3 88mm Anti Tank guns, 2 field trains.

Miscellaneous information on enemy artillery strength on our front, main supply route of all classes of supplies, as well as enemy strength reserves, and possible future defense plans.

The 1st Battalion os the 13th Infantry was the attached to the 28th Infantry to clear of the rest of the area. They were to pass through Company I and use the line which Company I had gained as their line of departure. As they were getting ready to jump off, they were caught in a terrific artillery barrage and were driven back. Casualties were extremely heavy and the Battalion had to reorganize. When this was completed they were ordered to jump off again, only to be caught in another artillery barrage and again casualties were heavy. They were then withdrawn and returned to their parent unit.

Company A of the 28th was sent in the following morning to replace the 1st Battalion, 13th Infantry, and immediately ran into a heavy mine field. The Regimental Mine platoon was then attached to clear the mine field. In doing this they were hit hard having only 13 men left but they accomplished their mission.

After the mine field was cleared, Company A jumped off and almost immediately ran into heavy artillery fire. The men were forced to take to their foxholes and stay there, due to the terrific amount of shrapnel flying around the position. All units were forced to spend the balance of that day all night under cover as artillery continued to pour in.

On the morning of the 25th, Company A moved forward into a new position after a hard battle. During all of this time it was still necessary to use carrying parties to supply the 1st Battalion and casualties had to be removed on the return trip. These carrying parties suffered quite heavy casualties and were under fire during most of the trip.

On November 28th the 3rd Battalion which had been occupying the line in Vossenack was ordered to take over from the 1st Battalion and at 2035 hours the exchange was complete. While the 1st Battalion had been on the line, they had been subject to terrific artillery fire and heavy casualties, receiving over 30,000 rounds in their area during a ten day period. An average of 3,000 rounds per day.

As the units of the 3rd Battalion replaced the 1st Battalion, patrols were sent out to ascertain the positions of the enemy. A patrol from Company L was sent out, they had advanced about 50 yards when they ran into a machine gun nest. They knocked out one machine gun but could advance no further. All companies were up to full strength except Company I who had suffered heavy casualties clearing out the area behind the 1st Battalion.

Later in the afternoon Company L was ordered to attack simultaneously with the 121st Infantry who were on their left, and capture Hill 50, approximately 1,000 yards to their front. When they attacked and accomplished their mission, Company I and Company K were moved up to secure their right flank. Physical contact was maintained with the 121st Infantry on the left. During this move Company L took 18 prisoners including two field artillery observers and knocked out four machine guns.

The day of November 30 was spent in organizing the ground the Battalion had taken and strong patrols were sent out to ascertain enemy strength and positions. Heavy artillery fire continued during the day. Late in the afternoon orders were received to attack and secure the high ground just west of Brandenburg. The 121st Infantry was to attack and secure the road leading into Brandenburg. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 28th were to attack in a southeasterly direction. Combat Command R of the 5th Armored Division was to attack and secure Brandenburg. The time for the coordinated attack was set for 0630, 1 December 1944. Lt.Col,(then Capt.) Clarence K. Hollingsworth was in command and the attack jumped off on time. The Battalion advanced steadily in spite of the withering machine gun fire and heavy artillery. At noon the Battalion was in the draw just west of the objective. Small arms fire was more intense and mortar and artillery fire was increasing. At this time a strong counterattack came up on the right flank from the zone of the Battalion on the right. After a vicious firefight the counterattack was beaten off and 28 prisoners were taken. The companies reorganized and pushed forward again at 1300 hours. They infiltrated enough men across the draw and up on the hill to build up a base of fire. Slowly but surely part of Company K made their way up the very steep hill, finally securing a foothold, then they worked the rest of the company up the hill and were on their objective at 1500 hours.

Company L was counterattacked on the right flank and drawn back. They tried to work their way up to Company K on the right flank but were again counterattacked and drawn back. Lt.Col Hollingsworth then decided to have them side slip to the left flank. This time they fought their way to the objective and tied in physically with Company K. Lt.Col. Hollingsworth who was with the reserve company on the high ground just behind the objective started down into the draw with Company I to join the other two companies in their objective. They were met with a furious counterattack up the draw from the right flank. The machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire was the worst that had yet been encountered, The 1st Platoon of Company I was completely annihilated. The company commander was killed and one platoon leader and three platoon sergeants were captured. In order to beat off this attack Captain Edward Williamson, Liaison Officer with the 45th Field Artillery Battalion, laid down and adjusted fire in the draw between the reserve company and the front line. The enemy suffered severe casualties and finally withdrew.

At the same time Company I was hit, front lies companies were attacked from the right front. The Germans kept calling for them to surrender, which only made the men fight that much harder. They mowed the Germans down as they rushed the positions, 49 prisoners were taken during this counterattack. It was estimated that at least 100 Germans were killed and as many wounded. Col. Hollingsworth decided to button up for the night as they were, communications were good and it was getting dark. The next big problem was supply and evacuation of the wounded. Everyone but the 3rd Battalion had failed to move, thus leaving both flanks exposed. The only possible route was through the mine infested woods which was impassible to vehicles. Once more carrying parties had to be resorted to.

Ammunition and supplies were to leave the rear area at approximately 1730 hours. The carrying party consisted of Headquarters Company 3rd Battalion almost entirely, mortar platoon Company M, 12 men from Regimental Headquarters, and 20 men from Cannon Company. The guide who was to lead the carrying party forward got lost, and it was necessary to send a patrol back from Battalion to pick them up and lead them in. The carrying party, and the patrol met at approximately 2330 hours. The supplies and ammunition were delivered to the companies at 0200 hours 2 December 1945. The trip was over about 3,000 yards of the toughest terrain imaginable. The carrying party was almost beaten by the time they reached the front line companies, but the wounded had to be gotten out. There was a total of twenty litter and thirty walking wounded. The carrying party finally returned with the wounded at 0730 hors. Nothing but sheer guts and fortitude ever got them over the steep hills and through the thick woods with the litters.

The rolls and overcoats of the men had been dropped in the previous area and could not be gotten up to the men. Between the enemy artillery and mortar fire and the cold and rain the men spent one of their most miserable nights huddled together in their foxholes.

Company A of the 1st Battalion was attached to the 3rd Battalion and was put on the right flank to give protection to the open flank. The mission of the 3rd Battalion for the following day was to assist the attack of the 1st Battalion on the right by fire only. Artillery and mortar fire was heavy. The enemy counterattacked at approximately 1000 hours. The attack was completely repulsed with heavy casualties being inflicted upon the enemy. The supplies were again carried over the tortuous 3,000 yard route by hand and the wounded evacuated by the same route. It was till raining and temperature getting lower, the men still had no rolls or overcoats. No fire could be built to get warm. The men gritted their teeth and held on.

On December 3, 1944, 121st Infantry on the left started moving into Brandenburg. Company L was hit by a counterattack from their left rear. 25 Germans were killed and 5 captured in repulsing this attack. Late in the afternoon patrol contact was made with Combat Command R of the 5th Armored Division in Brandenburg.

The 3rd Battalion of the 28th Infantry was assigned the mission of cleaning out the woods just west of town and outposting the town. This mission was accomplished. The long supply route was again used.

On December 4,1944, Combat Command R attacked Bergstein, the 3rd Battalion, 28th Infantry was to attack at the same time across the open ground southwest of Bergstein. This mission was accomplished with few casualties. The Battalion strength on line at this time consisted of approximately 250 men. The supplies were now taken through Brandenberg by, jeep relieving the supply and evacuation difficulties. Rolls and overcoats that could be secured were brought up to the men but a large number of these coats and rolls had been demolished by direct hits from enemy artillery and mortar fire.

On December 5,1944, the enemy launched a counterattack at Bergstein in the strength of two infantry Battalions with tanks attached, from the direction of Schmidt. Company K plus an attached machine gun platoon of Company M were in the way of the attackers. The machine gunners allowed the enemy within 25 yards of their position before they opened fire. When the machine gun and rifleman opened up it was at point blank range, the enemy had come across approximately 300 yards of open ground before they were fired on by the machine gunners and riflemen. The initial burst of fire from all weapons threw the enemy in a panic and he started retreating across the open ground. The artillery caught them in the open without cover and completed the massacre. Company K took 35 prisoners and knocked out one tank, killed at least 150, and wounded many more. Meanwhile the attack bounced off all the way up and down the Battalion line. The information received from the prisoners taken during this counterattack indicated that the ground was to be retaken regardless of the price in lives to the Germans. They were promised the Iron Cross 3rd Class and furloughs to their homes. The 3rd Battalion not only annihilated the enemy but gave such confidence the C.C.R. 5th Armored Division and the 2nd Ranger Battalion who were on their flank that they did not retreat.

The following two days were spent in reorganizing and preparing the attack in the direction of Schmidt.

On the night of December 8,1944, The Battalion was relieved from the line and was assigned to the 13th Infantry to act as reserve Battalion. During the relief of the Battalion, Company K was given the mission of protecting the northeast flank of Bergstein and to be prepared to counterattack Hill 400 which the enemy was storming with continuous attacks in an attempt to regain this dominating terrain feature.

At approximately 0200 hours, December 9,1944, Company L was assigned the mission of supporting Company I of the 13th Infantry in clearing the gap between the 121st Infantry and Hill 400 and down to the banks of the Roer River. This action brought trials and tribulations, the enemy had to regain Hill 400, but despite repeated day and night counterattacks, his efforts availed him little. Three of these counterattacks were beaten off in fierce hand to hand combat. During this period Company L of the 28th Infantry completed all missions assigned to it and in two cases assisted units of the 13th Infantry in obtaining their objectives.

During the period between November 28,1944 and December 16,1944 the Battalion had over 380 officers and men as casualties. The number of prisoners taken was 139 and it was estimated that over 700 Germans were killed and in excess of that number wounded.

For their outstanding work in the Hurtgen Forest the 3rd Battalion received a Presidential citation and are now the proud wearers of the Distinguished Unit Badge. While this had been happening to the 1st and 3rd Battalions, the 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry had relieved 2nd Battalion, 109th Infantry in a sector of the line in the woods to the right of Vossenack. Horses and carts were used to supply the front line companies as it was impossible to send a vehicle into the area. This worked all right as long as there was no artillery or mortar fire. The horses were afraid and shied away from the noise. It ended with carrying parties supplying the front line companies. The Germans counterattacked almost daily, sometimes two and three times a day. The men had to continuously on the alert, and because of the rain and cold and almost continuous artillery or mortar fire, the men had a miserable time. Half of the time they could not leave the foxholes during the day and a few minutes at night were the only times they got out of their holes.

On November 29, 1944, the Battalion was ordered to extend their left flank. At 0700 hours on the morning of the 30th, one platoon of Company E moved out and immediately ran into strong enemy positions where they were held up by heavy enemy machine gun, artillery, and mortar fire, our own mortars and artillery pounded the draw just north of the position, then Company E attacked again and gained their objective although they suffered heavy casualties doing so. At 0700 hours December 1,1944, Company F received orders to attack and extend the flank still further. An artillery and mortar barrage was laid down and when it stopped Company F jumped off. They had only gone a short distance when they ran into heavy enemy wire entanglements and were stopped. A patrol from Company F was sent out to investigate and reported back that the enemy was well dug in behind the wire and was using American 30 caliber and 50 caliber machine guns. A barrage from 155mm guns and 4.2 mortars was placed on the positions but the enemy was too well dug in, and when the barrage was lifted, Company F was still unable to advance.

After several attempts it was decided to wait until morning. The following morning two platoons of Company G were sent around through Vossenack to attack the flank. This action took the enemy by surprise and very little resistance was met in taking the objective. Shortly after taking the objective a radio message was received ordering the platoons to withdraw. This was done and then it was discovered the message had been of German origin. It was then decided to infiltrate Company G back into these positions during the night. At 0400 hours on December 3,1944 Company G moved out from Vossenack on an azimuth of 162 degrees, they advanced only a short distance before running into heavy machine gun and mortar fire,and were stopped. A platoon of tanks was attached to the Battalion and were sent down to assist Company G, but due to the mud and woods was unable to coordinate properly and was withdrawn. Company F was then sent out to attack from the front, they too ran into heavy machine gun and mortar fire. A coordinated counterattack was then tried but stopped by enemy artillery. Another attack was

launched later in the day and for the first time since Normandy the Luftwaffe joined in strafing and bombing our positions, this together with the artillery and mortars stopped the attack and the companies were forced to withdraw to their old positions where they buttoned up for the night.

On the morning of December 4, 1944, Major Regan the Battalion Commander called Regiment and asked for additional help as he had a front of 1,600 yards to defend and only 366 men left on the line, and that it was impossible to attack and make any headway with the line so thinly held. According to estimates the enemy numbered 200 and were well dug in with plenty of machine guns, mortars and artillery to support them. It was then decided to attach a company of tanks and to lay down a heavy artillery barrage previous to the jump off. This was tried and at 1515 hours the Battalion moved out. At 1645 the objective still had not been taken and as it was getting dark the Battalion was ordered to return to their old positions for the night.

Heavy artillery and mortar fire was laid on the enemy position all night long. The following morning Company G jumped off on the attack on the eastern end of Vossenack, but ran into such excessive machine gun and small arms fire that it was impossible to move any further and the Company was ordered to return to their old position. The tanks fired on enemy positions and in return were fired upon by enemy tanks from the vicinity of Kommerscheidt. This tank duel continued for three hours with neither side making any headway. Things continued about the same for the next two days. On December 6,1944, Col.P.D. Ginder, an attack expert from the V Corps came down to take over the Battalion for this operation. The Regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance platoon and Cannon Company were attached to the 2nd Battalion. This still did not solve the problem and for two days no headway was made.

On the 8th of December the 13th Infantry took over the portion of the line occupied by Company F who went into another part of the line. This cut down the battalion front considerably. At the same time Anti-tank Company and Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon were put into the line with the 2nd Battalion. A task force consisting of the I&R Platoon, Cannon Company, AT Company, and the A & P Platoon, supported by tanks began driving on the enemy positions. Companies E and G were hitting the left flank and Company F came in from the right. At 0815 hours the task force was on the objective. A strong counterattack developed, but with the help of the tanks it was beaten off. One tank was knocked out but immediately replaced. At noon 21 cooks from the Battalion kitchens were brought up for a reserve. During the afternoon enemy planes again came over strafing and bombing. Over 50 prisoners were taken during the day.

By 0900 hours the next morning Companies E,F,and G, had tied in with the Task Force. The rest of the morning was spent in reorganizing and consolidating positions. In the meantime another Task Force had jumped off and made good progress. At 1530 hours the task force reported that they were just about surrounded by Germans and a counterattack developed. One platoon from Company E was cut off and captured. The attack was finally repulsed with heavy casualties on both sides. On December 10, 1944, it was still the same story, attack, counterattack, and heavy casualties before the objectives were reached and the flanks tied in.

December 11,1944, an advance party of the 311th Infantry arrived to look over the positions, an order came down that the 2nd Battalion would be relieved by elements of the 311th Infantry on December 13.

During the period from November 18, 1944, to the 13th of December, 1944, the 2nd Battalion had over 500 casualties, or about 60 per cent of the Battalion. Officer casualties were proportionately heavier, amounting to almost 75 per cent.

For their heroic work during this time 1st Lt. Paul W. Cowden and 1st Lt. (then S/Sgt.) William Mosenstein were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

On December 15, 1944, the 2nd Battalion was sent back into the line to relieve the 1st battalion. Their main mission being to assist the 13th Infantry in taking their objectives. By 24 December this had been accomplished and except for patrols and digging in a Regimental Reserve line very little was done. On February 8, a journal entry states, "Thus ended the Battle of the Hurtgen Forest-Probably the most contested spot in Germany

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This history of the 28th Infantry comes from the official Regt. records. This version is made possible by the effort of Eric Olson. It was developed for the use of 8th Division Veterans and their families to help understand the unit's role in WW2. This edited and updated version is copyright 1999 by the Cantigny Press. It may not be reproduced without permission.